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ABSTRACT
Studying the recent experience of Brazil the paper explains how default risk is at the centre of the
mechanism through which an emerging market central bank that targets inflation might lose control
of inflation--in other words of the mechanism through which the economy might move from a
regime of "monetary dominance" to one of "fiscal dominance". The literature, from Sargent and
Wallace (1981) to the modern fiscal theory of the price level has discussed how an unsustainable
fiscal policy may hinder the effectiveness of monetary policy, to the point that an increase in interest
rates can have a perverse effect on inflation. We show that the presence of default risk reinforces
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A single variable describes, day by day, what investors think about the state
Brazil’s economy: the Brazilian component of the Emerging Market Bond Index,
the Embi spread 1. This spread is the diﬀerence between the yield on a dollar-
denominated bond issued by the Brazilian government and a corresponding one
issued by the U.S. Treasury: it is thus a measure of the markets’ assessment of
the probability that Brazil might default on its debt obligations. The Brazilian
Embi spread was 700 basis points (b.p.) in February 2002 and reached a peak
of 2,400 b.p. in July; after the October 2002 elections the spread has gradually
fallen: it was 450 b.p. in December 2003, after Brazil’s rating was raised from B
to B+. (For a comparison, throughout this period the Mexican spread hovered
around 300-400 b.p.).2
All ﬁnancial variables in Brazil ﬂuctuate in parallel with the Embi spread,
most notably the exchange rate. The channel through which ﬂuctuations in the
Embi s p r e a da r et r a n s m i t t e dt ot h ee x c h a n g er a t ea r ec a p i t a lﬂows: an increase
in the country risk premium leads to a sudden stop of capital ﬂows and to a
(real) depreciation which is needed to generate the trade surplus required to
oﬀset the decrease in net capital inﬂows. In turn, ﬂuctuations in the exchange
rate induce corresponding ﬂuctuations in the ratio of public debt to gdp, since
one half of Brazil’s debt (See Table 1) is either denominated in dollars or indexed
to the dollar, though payable in the domestic currency: the net public debt, as
a share of gdp, was 0.54 January 2002, reached 0.62 in July and was back to
0.55 in October.
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1The EMBI index is computed by J. P. Morgan.
2For a persepctive on economic developments in Brazil during 1999-2003, the period studied
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1Table 1
Composition of the Brazilian public debt (percent of total), December 2002
$-denominated bonds issued abroad 25.8
domestic bills indexed to the dollar 23.9
inﬂation indexed bonds 8.5
ﬁxed-rate bonds 3.0
domestic ﬂoaters linked to the Selic 31.1
other 7.7
Domestic interest rates at all maturities are also aﬀected by ﬂuctuations in
the Embi spread. In the case of the policy rate, the Selic, the mechanism works
via the exchange rate: exchange rate ﬂuctuations move inﬂation expectations,
and the central bank, as we shall document in this paper, looks at inﬂation
expectations when deciding on the level of the Selic.A ni n c r e a s ei nt h eEmbi
spread can also aﬀect inﬂation expectations directly, if it is accompanied by
concerns about the possibility of future monetization of part of the public debt.
Domestic interest rates at longer maturities (where ”longer” in Brazil today
means one to 18 months) are aﬀected by the Embispread in two ways: indirectly,
through the Selic, because ﬂuctuations in the Selic move the term structure,
and directly because long term interest rates reﬂect term premia which are
aﬀected by default risk even at relatively short maturities.
The bottom line is that the cost of servicing the public debt ﬂuctuates very
closely with the Embi spread. Understanding what determines this spread, how
it responds to domestic monetary and ﬁscal policies and to international factors,
how it interacts with the exchange rate and domestic interest rates, is thus
the necessary ﬁrst step in order to understand macroeconomic developments in
Brazil.
In a number of papers Guillermo Calvo (Calvo et al., 1993, Calvo 2002) has
observed that emerging market risk premia are correlated with international
factors, in particular with worldwide measures of investors’ ”appetite” for risk,
such as, for instance, the spread between the yield on U.S. corporate bonds and
that on U.S. Treasuries. In fact, Calvo goes as far as suggesting that once one
accounts for international ﬁnancial shocks, domestic factors in emerging markets
have a limited role in explaining variables such as Embi spreads: "Volatility
could partly be explained by ﬁnancial vulnerability in the EMs themselves, but
the global nature of the phenomenon raises the suspicion that there are systemic
problems largely independent of each individual country. [ ... ] Contagion could
stem from the way the capital market operates, e.g., crises generated by margin
calls." (Calvo, 2002, p. 1) 3
3While the empirical evidence consistently shows that one of the main determinants of
emerging market spreads are international factors, there are diﬀerent views as to what such
factors might be. Kamin and von Kleist (1999) and Eichengreen and Mody (2000) report a
negative relationship between the level of long term U.S. interest rates and spreads. Arora
and Cerisola (2001) ﬁnd that the stance and predictability of U.S. monetary policy are also
2The experience of Brazil supports Calvo’s observation. The Brazilian Embi
spread is indeed correlated with the U.S. corporate spread, but this correlation
is not constant over time. Figure 1 shows the two variables in the top panel,
and, in the lower panel, the time proﬁle of their correlation: the coeﬃcients
of recursive regressions of the Embi spread on the U.S. corporate spread. One
of the ﬁndings of this paper is that this non-linearity depends on the state of
domestic ﬁscal policy: when the level of the primary budget surplus is large
enough to keep the debt-to-gdp ratio stable, the response of the Embi spread
to the U.S. corporate spread is muted; when instead ﬁscal fundamentals are
weaker the response is ampliﬁed. .
[Insert here Figure 1]
The role of domestic ﬁscal policy in determining the response of the Embi
spread to international shocks suggests that the eﬀectiveness of inﬂation tar-
geting may depend on the ﬁscal policy regime.4 Consider the eﬀects of a shock
to the risk premium which depreciates the exchange rate and raises inﬂation
expectations. When the primary surplus is constantly adjusted so that its level
is always large enough to keep the debt ratio stable, inﬂation targeting works:
an increase in the Selic oﬀsetts the initial exchange rate depreciation, at least
partially. With one half of the debt denominated in dollars, the partial stabi-
lization of the exchange rate limits the impact of higher short rates on the cost
of debt service: the increase in the primary surplus needed to stabilize the debt
is thus correspondingly small.
Instead, in a ﬁscal policy regime that keeps constant the level of the primary
surplus, an international ﬁnancial shock may put the debt ratio along an un-
stable path: in such a situation the economy may fall in a "bad equilibrium"
where monetary policy has perverse eﬀects.
The dynamics in the bad equilibrium can be described as follows. With a
short duration of the public debt an increase in the Selic raises the cost of debt
service: if the primary surplus remains unchanged, the debt level rises, and so
does the Embi spread. The increase in the spread adds to the initial increase
in debt, especially since it is accompanied by a depreciation of the exchange
rate, which raises the value of dollar-denominated bonds in terms of domestic
gdp. The exchange rate depreciation also aﬀects inﬂation expectations and,
eventually, inﬂation itself. This induces the central bank to increase the Selic
further, which further raises the cost of debt service, and so on.
The diﬃculties of running monetary policy in an environment where ﬁnancial
markets think that ﬁscal policy is unsustainable–in the sense that it violates
the conditions for the sustainability of the public debt—are well known. Sargent
signiﬁcant in determining capital market conditions in emerging markets. Herrera and Perry
(2002) consider jointly the importance of US monetary policy and of US corporate bond
spreads and allow for diﬀerent long and short run eﬀects: their results strengthen the evidence
on the importance of international factors.
4Sims (2003) argues that ﬁscal policy may render an inﬂation trageting regime ineﬀective.
3and Wallace (1981) were among the ﬁrst to point out that a reduction in the
growth rate of money can result in higher, rather than lower inﬂa t i o ni ft h e
government relies on seigniorage as a source of revenue and the budget surplus
is not adjusted after the fall in seigniorage revenue. Sometimes, and often with
speciﬁc reference to Latin America, this situation has been referred to as a
regime of “ﬁscal dominance” 5. More recently, but in the same vein, the "ﬁscal
theory" of the price level (as ﬁrst discussed in Woodford, 1994) has argued that,
if the primary budget surplus is exogenous, the price level is the only variable
that can balance the government’s intertemporal budget constraint: given an
exogenous sequence of budget surpluses, there is only one price level which
makes the stock of nominal bonds inherited from the past consistent with the
present value of those primary surpluses. Thus, following a shock that raises the
cost of debt service, if the sequence of primary surpluses does not change, the
price level will have to rise for the government’s intertemporal budget constraint
to keep being balanced: this may result in an inconsistency between inﬂation
targeting and ﬁscal policy (a point shown in Uribe, 2003).67
While pointing in the right direction, the ﬁscal theory of the price level runs
into a problem in countries, such as Brazil, where a signiﬁcant fraction of the
public debt is either denominated in a foreign currency, or indexed to a foreign
currency. In such a situation a jump in the price level may not be suﬃcient to
balance the government’s intertemporal budget constraint if the primary surplus
is exogenous. When debt is dollar-denominated and risk premia are volatile, the
channel through which—if the primary budget surplus is exogenous—international
ﬁnancial shocks can destabilize the economy is credit risk.8 This is what our
paper shows with speciﬁc reference to the experience of Brazil in 2002-03.
The paper proceeds in three steps. We ﬁrst document the non-linearity in the
response of the Embi spread to international ﬁnancial shocks. Then we study
how the Embi spread aﬀects the cost of debt service and thus the dynamics of
the public debt: we estimate risk premia on various ﬁnancial instruments and
on the exchange rate, and we show that they all move in parallel with the Embi
spread. Finally, we analyze a small short run model of the Brazilian economy
to show how the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy depends on the ﬁscal policy
regime.
5See Tanner and Ramos (2002) for a discussion of ﬁscal dominance in the context of Brazil.
6In the context of Brazil a model with these features is analyzed by Loyo (1999). In Loyo’s
model higher interest rates cause the outside ﬁnancial wealth of private agents to grow faster
in nominal terms: this raises inﬂation. If the central bank responds by raising nominal rates,
so that real interest rates increase as well, then a vicious circle might arise. In Loyo’s model
there are only one-period bonds. As we show in this paper, term premia and credit risk
reinforce the possibility that such a vicious circle might arise, making the ﬁscal constraint on
monetary policy more stringent.
7Niepelt (2004) shows, however, that in a rational expectations equilibrium the ﬁscal theory
of the price level does not introduce ﬁscal eﬀects beyond those suggested by Sargent and
Wallace.
8Extensions of the ﬁscal theory to allow for the presence of credit risk are studied in Uribe
(2003).
42 Fiscal fundamentals and Brazilian risk
Since 1999, Brazilian public debt, as a fraction of gdp, has steadily increased—in
part because the primary surplus, though rising, has never been suﬃcient to
stabilize the debt, in part because, over time, the government has recognized
previously hidden liabilities—"skeletons" in Brazilian jargon, particularly in the
balance sheets of state-owned banks (see Figure 2) 9.
[Insert here Figure 2]
Looking for domestic factors that might explain Brazilian risk—beyond its
correlation with international factors, it is thus natural to start from the level
of the debt and of the primary surplus that would be required to keep the debt
ratio stable. We have analyzed the possibility that the response of the Brazilian
Embi spread to the U.S. corporate bond spread is non-linear, and depends on
the state of ﬁscal policy, by estimating the following model which relates the
Embi spread to ﬁscal variables 10:
Embit = γ0 + γ1Embit−1 + γ
0
2,t Spread U.S.
t + γ3∆Spread U.S.
t +  1,t (1)
where Embi is the Brazil component of the Embi spread, Spread U.S. is the
spread between the yield on U.S. corporate bonds rated BAA with a maturity
between 10 and 20 years, and a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond, and ∆SpreadU.S de-
notes the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the corporate bond spread. All spreads are measured
in basis points. We also include ∆Spread U.S to capture the eﬀect of jumps in
the Embi spread, independently of the non-lineraity. The time-varying response
of the Embi spread to the U.S. spread, γ
0
2,t, is non-linear and depends on the








9For an analysis of the recent dynamics of the public debt in Brazil see Favero and Giavazzi
(2002).
10The idea of a non-linear response builds on the intuition of Kamin and von Kleist (1999)
who ﬁnd that spreads respond to the interaction between the U.S. term spread and the coun-
try’s rating.
11The non-linearity makes our estimated equation a speciﬁc case of the LSTAR (Logistic
Smooth Transition Autoregressive) model discussed for instance in Tong (1983). The LSTAR
speciﬁcation is more ﬂexible than a simple interaction term: in our case, for instance, since it
allows for the response of term premia to international factors to vary depending on the level
of the debt ratio relative to an estimated threshold.
5xt is the primary budget surplus, and x∗
t is the level of the primary surplus
that keeps the debt-to-gdp ratio constant.12 For xt = x∗
t, γ
0
2,t = γ2/2; γ
0
2,t rises
as xt falls below x∗
t.
We estimate (1) using lagged variables as instruments to take care of the
endogeneity of x∗
t: the debt-stabilizing primary surplus is inﬂuenced by the
exchange rate, which in turn, as we discussed in the introduction, is correlated
with the Embi spread. The results are reported in Table 2.
We have also considered an alternative measure of ﬁscal fundamentals, the






. For debt levels above γ4 the response of
Embi to Spread U.S. increases (non-linearly) above γ2. Since the debt ratio is
also correlated with the exchange rate, we instrument b with its trend, estimated
using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter: the ﬁltered variable is no longer correlated with
ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate. The value of γ4 we estimate is about 54
per cent, the level of the net public debt, as a percent of gdp, in April 2002.
(see Table 2.) The estimate is rather stable: when we restrict the sample and
only use data from August 1999, it remains virtually unchanged; in the shorter
sample, however, the elasticity of the Embi spread with respect to the U.S.
corporate spread is signiﬁcantly higher. Figure 3 shows the estimated values of
γ
0
2,for the speciﬁc a t i o nt h a tm a k e st h i sc o e ﬃcient a function of xt− x∗
t.13
In the econometric model of the Banco Central do Brazil 14 the equation
for the Embi spread includes foreign reserves, the current account and debt,
all as a fraction of gdp, but not the U.S. corporate spread. The debt variable
is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. When we add to our speciﬁcation foreign
exchange reserves and the current account, we ﬁnd that they are not signiﬁcant.
We also tried including in this regression the Selic rate, to test whether mone-
tary policy aﬀects the risk premium directly: it is not signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding
suggests that monetary policy aﬀects the risk premium only indirectly, through
its eﬀects on the debt level.
We have investigated the robustness of our speciﬁcation by replacing the
U.S. corporate spread with alternative measures of international factors used
in the empirical literature: the level of U.S. long term interest rates and the
Federal Funds rate. The main result, that is the non-linearity, is preserved.
12x∗
t ≡ (it−nt−πt
1+nt+πt )bt−1 where b is the debt-gdp ratio, π the infaltion rate, n real gdp
growth and
_
i is the average interest cost of the debt.
_
it =( 1 − µ)((1 + it)
1






12 − 1) St
St−1 where µ is the share of public debt denominated in dol-
lars, or indexed to the dollar, (1 − µ) the share that is linked to the Selic rate, it,a n dSt is
the level of the exchange rate. We thus include in the cost of debt service the amortization of
$-denominated bonds.
13In building Figure 3 we have computed x∗
t assuming that the nominal growth rate of the
economy and the average nominal cost of debt service, remain costant over time.
14See Kfoury and Lago Alves (2003).
6Table 2
Explaining Brazil’s Embi spread
Using the level of the deviation of the primary surplus from the debt-stabilizing
level
Sample 1999:08 to 2004:01 (TSLS)







Using the debt level
Sample 1991:02 to 2003:06 (LS using an HP ﬁlter for b)











Using the debt level
Sample 1999:07 to 2003:06 (LS using an HP ﬁlter for b)











[Insert here Figure 3]
3T h e Embi spread and other risk premia
In economies like the U.S., expected future interest rates account for the bulk
of the spread between long-term rates and policy rates: this is because the
volatility of future expected policy rates is low and credit risk is not an issue. In
emerging markets, on the contrary, the volatility of policy rates is much higher
and default risk generates sizeable risk premia. The technique we show in this
section allows to identify the role of credit risk in determining the slope of the
yield curve.
We start by estimating a monetary policy rule, which we then use to predict
the path of future Selic rates: comparing these forecasts with observed long
term yields (from swap contracts), and assuming no expetational errors, we can
build an estimate of the credit risk component of the slope of the yield curve.
We shall close the section showing that our estimates of credit risk premia at
various maturities are highly correlated with the Embi spread.
3.1 The monetary policy rule
The best way to describe Brazilian monetary policy since the adoption of a ﬂoat-
ing exchange rate regime, in February 1999, is through a simple monetary policy
rule where the Selic rate responds to one-year ahead inﬂation expectations:
7Selict = ρSelict−1 +( 1− ρ)(βo + β1 (Etπt,t+12 − π∗
t)) +  2,t (2)
Etπt,t+12 is the one-year ahead expected inﬂation rate, measured from the daily
survey conducted by the central bank and π∗
t is the central bank inﬂation target.
We estimate this rule over a sample that starts in January 2000. 15 The results
are:
Table 3
Parameters of the estimated monetary policy rule
Sample 2000:01 to 2004:01







β1, the response of the Selic rate to a deviation of inﬂation expectations
from the target, is greater than unity: this indicates that monetary policy does
not accommodate inﬂation, and that real interest rates are raised when inﬂation
expectations increase. The Selic rate also appear to be rather persistent, with
an autocorrelation coeﬃcient of 0.92.16.
3.2 Term premia on"long-term" interest rates
Since the market for long-dated bonds is very thin, we study domestic long term
interest rates using data on swap contracts. These are contracts where one party
receives the Selic and pays a ﬁxed rate for maturities up to 18 months. What
gets exchanged in a swap contract are two ﬂows of interest payments on a
notional principal: the principal itself is never exchanged. ”Default”, in a swap
15Both the monetary and the ﬁscal policy regimes changed sharply after the 1999 deval-
uation: monetary policy shifted from an exchange rate peg to an inﬂation target, and the
primary budget moved in a few years from balance to a sizable surplus. These policy shifts
make the data up to 1999 of limited use for our purposes.
16In Favero and Giavazzi (2002) we experimented adding to this monetary policy rule
more arguments, such as the output gap and the realized change in the exchange rate.
The coeﬀcients on such variables were not signiﬁcant and the dynamic simulations of
the extended version of the rule did not provide any substantial improvement on the
baseline with expectations only. We also experimented estimating the rule with daily data:
even at this very high frequency the results are virtually identical. The following Table
shows the results using daily data and also adding the survey-based measure of exchange
rate expectations and the Embi spread on the right-hand side of the monetary policy rule.
Estimation of a monetary policy rule on daily data (January 3, 2000 to February 11, 2004)



























8contract, happens when one of the two parties stops paying: if this happens, the
other side will do the same, with no loss of principal. There is a loss, but this is
limited to the present discounted value of the contract which was interrupted.
In other words, there is a loss, but only because investors lose the protection
they thought they had bought by entering the swap contract. The default risk
on swaps is therefore much smaller than that on bonds, as measured by the
Embi spread, though both may be aﬀected by the same factors.
To construct a measure of term premia on swaps we start from a no-arbitrage
condition. Consider, for simplicity, zero-coupon bonds and deﬁne a term pre-
mium per period, rather than over the entire life of the bond: then the diﬀerence
between the one-period expected return of a multi-period bond and the risk-free
rate can be written as:
Et (pt+1,T − pt,T)=it,t+1 + φt,T
where pt,T is the (log of) the price at time t of a bond maturing at T ; it,t+1 is
the one-period return on the safe asset, the Selic 17; φt,T is the term premium,
deﬁned over a one-period horizon, on the bond maturing at T.A st h er e l a t i o n
between pt,T and the continuously compounded yield to maturity of a bond with
maturity T, it,T, is
pt,T = −(T − t)it,T
we have
it,T − (T − t − 1)Et (it+1,T − it,T)=it,t+1 + φt,T













We apply this decomposition to ﬁxed interest rates on swaps. The term pre-
mium on a T-month Brazilian ﬁxed rate swap reﬂects, as discussed above, two
components: the risk associated with the volatility of policy rates over the life of
the swap and some credit risk. We shall proceed as follows. We assume that the
central bank inﬂation target remains unchanged and we use the survey-based
expectations to construct a path for expected one-year-ahead inﬂation. Sim-
ulating the estimated monetary policy rule forward we then construct future
Selic rates, iF




















17We assume that the policy rate is a safe asset: the period-return of such an asset thus
coincides with its yield to maturity.
9where the parameters are those estimated in (2) and h can extend up to 12
months, the longest horizon over which we observe 12-month ahead inﬂation
expectations.
The diﬀerence between the yield on a T-period swap, iSW
t,T , and the appro-
priate average of future Selic rates thus includes two components: the pure
term premium and a term which measures how the stream of our interest rate
























Assuming no expectational errors, we can use (3) to build an observable
proxy of the term premium on T-period swaps.
To consider a concrete example of how swap rates decompose between ex-
pected future Selic rates and term premia, we compare the data for two dates:
October 15, 2002, at the peak of the latest Brazilian crisis, and May 19, 2003,
after the resolution of political uncertainty and a remarkable tightening of mon-
etary policy. On October 15 the Selic rate was 20.90 per cent, while the yield on
a 12-month ﬁxed interest rate swap was 32.69 per cent. The total spread, 1.179
b.p., decomposed in a decreasing pattern of expected policy rates coupled with
a risk premium as high as 1.315 points. On May the Selic was 26.32 while the
yield on a 12-month ﬁxed interest rate swap was 23.19 per cent. The inverted
yield curve is explained by a decreasing pattern of expected Selic rates coupled
with a value of the risk premium which had fallen to 275 b.p.
Having constructed a measure of the term premium on swaps, we can now
study how it correlates with the Embi spread. Before doing that, however, we
complete the analysis of term premia studying the exchange rate risk premium.
3.3 T h ee x c h a n g er a t er i s kp r e m i u m
Using the uncovered interest rate parity condition and survey data on exchange
rate expectations, we construct a measur eo ft h ee x c h a n g er a t er i s kp r e m i u m .
For both Brazilian and U.S. interest rates we use swap rates since, as discussed








t,T are, respectively, the interest rates on Brazilian swaps
of maturity T and on similar dollar-denominated swaps, and (Etst+T − st) de-
notes the survey-based expectations of the percent change in the exchange rate
over the life of these swaps. The Brazilian central bank collects, as for inﬂation
expectations, a daily survey of one-year ahead exchange rate expectations: using
such surveys, and 12—month U.S. and Brazilian swaps, we are able to measure
t h ee x c h a n g er a t er i s kp r e m i u m .
103.4 Term premia and the Embi spread
Table 4 shows the correlation between the Embi spread, the one-year ahead
exchange rate risk premium and the term premia on domestic swaps at three
diﬀerent maturities, 3, 6 and 12 months. For comparison we report an alter-
native measure of Brazilian default risk derived from credit default swaps. A
credit default swap (CDS) is a derivative contract in which a bondholder buys
a guarantee that covers him in the event of default: if the underlying bond
defaults the buyer of the insurance receives an amount equal to the diﬀerence
between the face value of the defaulted bond and a conventional recovery rate18.
From such contracts it is possible to compute the risk premium. The main ad-
vantage of CDS’s over Embi spreads is that CDS’s also exist for relatively short
maturities and are thus more directly comparable with swaps.
There is a remarkable degree of correlation among the four series. Risk pre-
m i am e a s u r e db yC D S ’ sa n dt h eEmbi spread are larger than the term premium
implicit in 12-month ﬁxed interest rates swap, consistently with the smaller ex-
posure of swaps to default risk discussed above. The correlation between the
risk premium on swaps and the Embi spread rises as the maturity of the swaps
increases: this is because the longer the life of a swap, the higher the proba-
bility that a default event might hit it. On 12-month swaps the correlation is
surprisingly high (0.70) especially since the Embispread is computed on 10-year
bonds, while swaps have a maturity of just 12 months. The correlation is high
also with the one-year ahead exchange rate risk premium indicating that default
risk is an important determinant of exchange rate ﬂuctuations
Table 4
Correlation between default risk, term premia and exchange rate risk premia
Sample: 1999:2 - 2003:1
Embi e.r. r.p. 12-m TP 3-m TP 6-m TP 12-m CDS 3-m CDS 6-m CDS 12-m CDS 36-m
Embi 10 .84 0.31 0.56 0.82 0.88 0.92 0.96 0.98
e.r. r.p. 12-m 10 .63 0.79 0.89 0.73 0.76 0.80 0.83
TP 3-m 10 .91 0.66 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.29
TP 6-m 10 .88 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.55
TP 12-m 10 .75 0.78 0.82 0.82
CDS 3-m 10 .97 0.95 0.94
CDS 6-m 10 .98 0.96
CDS 12-m 10 .99
CDS 36-m 1
18After a default most bonds continue to be traded at positive prices which reﬂect the
expectation of a settlement in which the entity which has defaulted will pay a fraction of the
bond’s face value. CDS are priced on the basis of conventional post-default trading prices,
b a s e do np a s te x p e r i e n c e .
114I n ﬂation targeting, country risk and ﬁscal pol-
icy
The analysis carried out so far helps us understand the way in which domes-
tic ﬁscal policy and international ﬁnancial shocks contribute to determine the
Embi spread and thus the cost of servicing the debt. The next step consists
in analyzing the channel through which country risk determines the interaction
between monetary and ﬁscal policy, and how it may prevent the central bank
from eﬀectively targeting inﬂation.
We shall do this by means of a small short run model of the Brazilian econ-
omy which focuses on risk, debt, the exchange rate and two policy rules, one for
the central bank, the other for the ﬁscal authorities. Because our focus is on the
short run, we take output as given—not an innocuous assumption, since output
growth is a critical factor in determining debt dynamics, but unavoidable to
keep the analysis simple.19
4.1 The exchange rate, the risk premium and the mone-
tary policy rule
We start by showing the eﬀects of the interaction between the exchange rate,
the risk premium and the monetary policy rule assuming, for the moment, that
the risk premium is exogenous. The result—a negative correlation between the
c h a n g ei nt h ee x c h a n g er a t ea n dt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ed i ﬀerential—has been shown by
McCallum (1994) and discussed in the context of inﬂation targeting by Alexius
(2002). The model consists of three equations:
it = ρi t−1 +( 1− ρ)(βo + β1 (Etπt+12 − π∗)) (5)
Etst+1 − st =( it − i∗
t)+ξt (6)
Etπt+12 − π∗ = δ1 (Et−1πt+11 − π∗)+( 1− δ1)[δ2(st − st−1) − π∗]+ 3,t (7)
• (5) is the monetary policy rule estimated in section 3.1;
• (6) is the uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIRP) where ξt repre-
sents the exchange rate risk premium;
• (7) describes the inﬂation expectations that enter (5).I n t h e c a s e o f
Brazil these expectations are observed: we can analyze their statistical
properties. When we do this, we ﬁnd that they are autocorrelated and
respond to the observed deviation of the rate of exchange rate depreciation
from π∗. This motivates (7)
19The evidence on the eﬀect of interest rates on output is weak in Brazil. The central bank
model ﬁnds a (negative) eﬀect of real 12-month swap rates, but the signiﬁcance of this variable
is rather weak. This does not mean that one is allowed to assume the eﬀect away, but the
evidence does not suggest a very strong impact, at least in the short run.
12Assume, to save notation, βo = δ1 =  3,t = i∗
t = π∗ =0 , and substitute (5)
and (7) in the UIRP condition to get:
Etst+1 − st = ρi t−1 +( 1− ρ)β1δ2(st − st−1)+ξt (8)
Deﬁning ∆st ≡ st − st−1 we can re-write (8) as:
Et∆st+1 = λ∆st + ρit−1 + ξt
where λ ≡ (1 − ρ)β1δ2. Assuming rational expectations, the reduced form








As discussed in McCallum (1994), the co-movement between chnages in the
exchange rate and the interest rate diﬀerential described in (9),w h i c hi st h e
result of the central bank following a rule such as (5),i so n eo ft h ew a y st o
explain the UIRP puzzle.
4.2 Inﬂation targets, country risk and ﬁscal policy
We now extend the model of the previous section by adding the determinants
o ft h ee x c h a n g er a t er i s kp r e m i u m ,ξt, which, based on our analysis, we assume
to coincide with the Embi spread and thus to be determined as in (1). We also
add a ﬁscal policy rule, which is needed to determine (xt − x∗
t) and thus the
response of the Embi spread to international shocks:
xt = ϕxt−1 +( 1− ϕ)x∗
t +  4,t (10)
for ϕ =0the primary budget surplus keeps the debt ratio constant at all
times; for ϕ =1the primary surplus is exogenous.20.
When we add to the model of equations (5) through (7) equation (1), the non-
linear equation for the Embi spread, we are no longer able to derive analytically
a reduced form solution such as (9): w eh a v et h u se s t i m a t e d(9) using the
Embi spread as an explanatory variable and allowing for an error term reﬂecting
20Following the terminology used by Woodford (1994), the two rules can be labeled Ricar-
dian and Non Ricardian, respectively.
13deviations from UIRP other than the risk premium.21 Using lagged variables
as instruments we obtain the following estimates:
Table 5
A reduced form exchange rate equation






+ α2Embit−1 + α3∆(Embi)t +  5,t (11)







The coeﬃcient on the interest rate diﬀerantial is negative: for a given U.S.
Fed Fund rate, a one percent increase in the Selic appreciates the exchange rate
by 0.16 percent. The Embi spread enters with a positive coeﬃcient: a higher
risk premium induces a depreciation. Note, however, that these are partial
equilibrium eﬀects. Both the Selic and the Embi spread are endogenous: it is
impossible, from this equation, to conclude what is the overall eﬀect of monetary
policy on the exchange rate. In the bad equilibrium, following an increase in
the Selic, the additional cost of debt servicec o u l di n d u c eal a r g ei n c r e a s ei nt h e
default risk—large enough so that the net eﬀect is a depreciation of the exchange
rate. This eﬀect is crucial for determining how monetary policy works.
Consider now the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nSpread U.S.. The direct eﬀect






(α2 + α3) The
extent to which monetary policy responds to the shock depends on its eﬀect on
expectations. The increase in the Embi spread, and the accompanying exchange
rate depreciation, raise inﬂation expectations: the reaction of the central bank
dampens the initial depreciation, so that the overall eﬀect on the exchange rate
remains ambiguous—it is (α2 + α3)[1− α1δ2 (1 − δ1)β1 (1 − ρ)]
−1 with α1 < 0.
This, however, is not the end of the story. The shock raises x∗
t,b o t hb e -
cause the exchange rate depreciation raises the debt stock, measured in units of
domestic goods, and because domestic interest rates also increase. If ϕ =0 , xt
will adjust one to one to match the increase in x∗
t: the burden of adjusting to
the ﬁnancial shock falls entirely on the ﬁscal authorities, while the central bank
maintains the control of inﬂation. For ϕ =1 , xt remains constant and (x∗
t −xt)
increases. This raises γ
0
2 and ampliﬁes the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial shock on the
risk premium. The result is further exchange rate depreciation, a further rise in
21An alternative consists in estimating (8) directly. This is the route followed by Blanchard
(2004): he also ﬁnds a violation of UIRP.
A simple example helps understanding why we may observe a negative correlation between
the expected depreciation and the interest rate diﬀerential. Assume Etst+1−st = it+ξt,a n d
it = −αξt, that is monetary policy responds directly to the exchange rate risk premium: an
increase in,ξt leads to lower domestic interest rates. Then Etst+1 − st = −[(1 − α)/α]it:i n
other words, the reason for the negative correlation is the deviation from UIRP (ξt),c o u p l e d
with a monetary policy rule that responds to ξt.
14the debt ratio, a further increase in x∗
t, and so on. The economy settles along
an unstable path, where debt increases and the central bank is unable to control
inﬂation.
4.3 T h ee x p e r i e n c eo fB r a z i l
In this section we use the model just described to understand the interaction
between country risk and monetary and ﬁscal policies in Brazil. We do this
by simulating the model under two alternative ﬁscal rules: one that keeps the
primary surplus constant 22, and an "almost Ricardian" rule, such as (10) for
ϕ =0 .75 23. We take as starting conditions those prevailing in June 2002. We
choose this date because this is when the Embi spread jumps above 1,000 b.p.—a
level the spread had never reached after the 1999 devaluation—,the exchange rate
starts depreciating and, most importantly, inﬂation expectations start rising.
Since, as we have seen, monetary policy reacts to inﬂation expectations, this is
when the action starts.
The model is composed of four equations: (5), (7), (11) plus the ﬁscal policy







bt−1. This requires that we specify the dynamics of inﬂation
and output growth. One way would be to calibrate these two equations using, for
example, the demand and supply equations estimated in the small econometric
model of the Banco do Brazil. We choose the alternative route of ﬁt t i n gav e r y
simple autoregressive process for real GDP growth 24, and for inﬂation a model
that is consistent with (7), the statistical properties of the observed inﬂation
expectations.
We run the two dynamic simulations proceeding as follows:
• As already mentioned, we take as initial conditions those prevailing in
June 2002: b =0 .55,x=0 .035,π e =0 .0049,π ∗ =0 .055,i=0 .184,
iUS
FedFund =0 .018,S p r e a dUS =3 5 0bp;
• In the simulation we keep all exogenous variables constant, except for π∗
which we allow to follow the path announced, in January 2003, by the
central bank: 0.085 in 2003 and 0.05 in 2004 25.
22This is essentially the ﬁscal rule followed by the Brazilian authorities since the 1999
devaluation and up to the 2002 election. When we estimate such a rule we ﬁnd: xt =
3,86(1−0,75)+0,75xt−1. There is no evidence of a reaction of xt to x∗
t: the primary surplus
is very persistent and the estimated long run level (3.86 per cent of gdp) is below the sample
average for x∗
t.
23This exercize clearly deﬁes the Lucas critique.
24The evidence on the eﬀect of interest rates on output is weak in Brazil. The central bank
model ﬁnds a (negative) eﬀect of real 12-months interest rates, but the signiﬁcance of this
variable is rather weak. This does not mean that one is allowed to assume the eﬀect away,
but the evidence does not suggest a very strong impact, at least in the short run. The output
growth equation we estimate is nt = γ1 + γ2nt−1 + ut.
25We keep the target constant at 0.085 throughout 2003; in 2004 we allow it to fall gradually,
reaching 0.05 in December.
15The results of the dynamic simulations under the two ﬁscal rules are shown
in Figure 4.
In June 2003 12-months ahead inﬂation expectations rise above the target
and the central bank raises interest rates. Under the "Non Ricardian" ﬁscal rule
(the dotted line in each of the six panels) the Selic eventually rises above 30
percent, and the Embi spread increases: the sharp monetary tightening cannot
prevent the depreciation of the exchange rate and inﬂation expectations stabilize
around 12 percent. The debt ratio explodes. 26
When ﬁscal policy reacts (with ϕ =0 .75 < 1)t oﬂuctuations in x∗, monetary
policy is eﬀective at stabilizing inﬂation expectations: this happens because the
Embi spread, after the initial shock stabilizes. The ﬁscal rule tightens the
primary surplus, but eventually, as the economy stabilizes, the budget can be
gradually relaxed. The ﬁscal tightening is particularly severe because the rule is
not fully Ricardian: for ϕ =1 .0 the primary surplus would not need to increase
so much. 27
[Insert Figure 4 here]
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Studying the recent experience of Brazil we have understood how default risk
is at the centre of the mechanism through which a central bank that targets
inﬂation might lose control of inﬂation—in other words of the mechanism through
which the economy might move from a regime of "monetary dominance" to one
of "ﬁscal dominance". The literature, from Sargent and Wallace (1981) to the
modern ﬁscal theory of the price level has discussed how an unsustainable ﬁscal
policy may hinder the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy, to the point that an
increase in interest rates can have a perverse eﬀect on inﬂation. We have shown
(consistently with the ﬁndings of Blancahrd in this volume) that the presence
of default risk reinforces the possibility that a vicious circle might arise, making
the ﬁscal constraint on monetary policy more stringent.
In the experience of Brazil we believe we have identiﬁed an interesting
episode where this might have happened, at least for a short period during
2002. But the episode also shows how critical the behavior of ﬁscal policy is.
Brazil, during 2002, had probably fallen into a bad equilibrium, where ﬁscal
policy was hindering the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. But the economy was
just over the edge: a small change in the ﬁscal rule, such as that announced by
26In this exercise inﬂation does not display the explosive behavior described in Loyo (1999)
and Sims (2003) in the case of a "non-Ricardian" ﬁscal regime. This is because the nonlinearity
in the response of the Embi spread to the corporate bond spread eventually dies out in our
speciﬁcation.
27We also computed the impulse responses to a shock to the corporate bond spread, starting
from the same initial conditions. This exercise, however, is not very informative, since it is
the non linearity of the model (which impulse responses fail to capture) that is responsible for
the sharp diﬀerence in results between the Ricardian and non Ricardian case.
16the Lula government in January 2003, was enough to bring the economy back to
normal conditions, and rapidly reduce the Embi spread, stabilize the exchange
rate and, through these two variables, inﬂation expectations, inﬂation and the
dynamics of the public debt.
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18Figure 1
The Embi Spread (left scale, percentage points) and the spread between BAA
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Figure 3
Elasticity of the Embi spread with respect to the U.S. corporate bond spread,











-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
20Figure 4
Targeting Inﬂation with an Exogenous Primary Budget Surplus and a
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